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Abstract. This contribution examines the rise of the BRICs (Brazil-Russia-India-
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Worldwide  Governance  Indicators  and  the  World  Values  Survey.  It  charts  the  shift  in 
economic weight and emerging reconfiguration of economic ties as evidenced in foreign 
direct  investment  (FDI)  and  the  emergence  of  transnational  corporations  (TNCs)  and 
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two brief case studies.  
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The rise of the BRIC economies 
BRIC – the acronym for Brazil-Russia-India-China – has almost drawn as much puns 
and quips as it has inspired discussions about the shifting weight in the world economy. 
Hinting at the dominating role of China, David Rothkopf pointed out that ‗[w]ithout China, 
the BRICs are just the BRI, a bland, soft cheese that is primarily known for the whine that 
goes with it‘ [1]. When South Africa joined the BRIC summit for the first time in 2011, 
turning BRIC into BRICS, Russian President Medvedev suggested that the new Russian 
acronym should be БРЮКИ to make it easier to remember for Russians (the letter Ю 
correspondes to the first letter in the Russian name for South Africa and turns the acronym 
into the Russian word for trousers). Expressing his disdain for the motley mixture of states 
it lumped together, Andrew Weiss dubbed the concept the BRIC-￠-brac, the French term 
for a collection of random curiosities [2]. And those who felt that BRIC unduly focused the 
attention  on  a  few  large  emerging  markets  have  promoted  CEMENT  –  countries  in 
emerging markets excluded by new terminology.  
Yet, despite frequent bon mots and misgivings about the concept, the brainchild of 
Jim  O‘Neill,  chief  economist  of  the  investment  bank  Goldman  Sachs,  has  made  a 
remarkable  career  within  just  ten  years  [3].  O‘Neill‘s  seminal  report  was  based  on  a 
projection of real (i.e. inflation-adjusted) GDP growth from 2001 to 2010. On this basis, he 
predicted  that  the  centre  of  gravitation  in  the  world  economy  would  move  towards 
emerging economies. No longer would the world‘s richest economies also be its largest. 
Ten years later, it appears apposite to assess O‘Neill‘s projections. Have they been far off 
the mark? Yes, in that they over- or underestimated growth rates, sometimes severely so 
(see Table 1). China, for example, grew 3.5 percentage points faster than predicted, despite 
the financial crisis of 2008, whereas the US grew 1.3 percentage points slower. But no, in 
that the predicted shift of the relative economic weight towards the BRIC countries turned 
out to be even more marked than O‘Neill had predicted. The economic development of the 
BRICs  and  the  sluggish  growth  in  the  established  economies  more  than  vindicated 
O‘Neill‘s initial thesis.  European researcher. 2011. № 12 (15) 
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Table 1 
Predicted and de-facto GDP growth in the BRIC countries, 2001–2010 
 
  Annual real GDP growth (2001-2010) 
  prediction  de facto  deviation 
Brazil  4.0  3.6  − 
Russia  4.0  4.9  + 
India   5.0  7.5  + 
China  7.0  10.5  + 
USA  3.0  1.7  − 
Euro Area  2.5  2.0  − 
UK  2.5  1.4  − 
Japan  1.0  0.7  − 
Sources: [3] and [4] 
 
If we adjust GDP growth for purchasing power, the BRICs in 2001 had a 17.0% share 
of world GDP, whereas this stood at 25.0% only ten years later. This increase was largely 
driven by China, which upped its share in the world economy from 7.6% to 14.3% in this 
period, whereas Brazil‘s contribution remained rather constant [4] Figure 1 shows that in 
terms of total purchasing power, China is drawing close to the US and logged remarkable 
growth rates over the past 30 years. Brazil and Russia, both rather resource-dependent 
economies, are on a considerably slower growth path. Russia‘s shrinkage bottomed out 
towards the end of the 1990s and it returned to sustained growth in 1999, while Brazil had 
a somewhat lower overall growth rate. 
 
 
Figure 1: Development of total GDP (PPP$) in the BRICs from 1980 to 2010 as 
compared to the United States and the EU-15 (Source: [5]) 
 
A look at the statistics for GDP per person (Figure 2) reveals that there is still much 
catching up to do for BRIC countries in terms of individual wealth. GDP per person of the 
wealthiest BRIC country, Russia, is still only one-fourth of that of the United States. What 
is more, total economic growth has not always translated into people becoming wealthier. 
China has done best in converting total growth into individual income increases, whereas 
Brazil has largely grown due to population growth and not because its population became 
wealthier.  European researcher. 2011. № 12 (15) 
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Figure 2: Development of GDP per person (PPP$) in the BRICs from 1980 to 2010  
as compared to the United States and the EU-15 (Source: [5]) 
 
Extending  our  purview  beyond  a  narrow  focus  on  the  GDP  reveals  a  number  of 
fundamental differences between the BRICs (Table 2). India, for example, is a member of 
the BRICs by virtue of the size of its economy but still has to grapple with major challenges 
in the area of human development. Adequate nutrition and basic education are still not the 
rule in many parts of the country: more than three quarters of its population live below the 
$2 (PPP) poverty line and more than one third are illiterate. Only 5 out of every 100 people 
are classified as internet users and most of its population lives in rural areas. For many 
people in India, the glitzy world of global business that gave birth to the concept of BRIC is 
a far cry from their daily realities.  
Russia,  by  contrast,  stands  out  because  of  its  dismal  performance  in  governance. 
Although all BRIC economies are far removed from the liberal ideal, Russia is particularly 
so. Corruption and graft are wide-spread and legal nihilism undermines the rule of law. In 
comparison to residents of the other BRIC countries, Russians also score much worse on 
the other major indicator of human well-being: happiness. According to the World Values 
Survey, Brazilians are three times more likely to feel very happy than Russians. Indians are 
also  happier  than  their  Russian  and  Chinese  counterparts,  underscoring  that  material 
wealth  is  not  equal  to  spiritual  well-being.  When  it  comes  to  androcentrism  and 
nationalism, Russia and India are unexpected sparring partners: both countries have high 
levels  of  nationalism,  paired  with  high  levels  of  androcentrism.  In  Brazil  and  China, 
declared  androcentrism  is  much  lower.  The  closest  match,  again,  seems  to  be  on  the 
economic side: what unites citizens of the BRIC states is a strong preference for pursuing 
economic growth as the primary aim of the country over other aims such as more public 
participation.  
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Table 2 
Key indicators of the BRIC economies (2009) (Source: [5],  
unless indicated otherwise) 
 
  Brazil  Russia  India  China 
         
Socio-Economic Indicators         
Population (2009) [million]  193.7  141.9  1,155.3  1,331.5 
Population (projection 2030) [6]  240.2  124.1  1,460.7  1,391.5 
Population (projection 2050) [6]  260.7  109.2  1,656.6  1,303.7 
GDP [trillion current USD]  1.59  1.23  1.38  4.99 
GDP per capita [current USD]  8,230  8,684  1,192  3,744 
GDP per capita, PPP [current 
USD] 
10,367  18,932  3,296  6,828 
Income level  upper 
middle 
upper 
middle 
lower 
middle 
lower 
middle 
External debt stocks [of GNI]  17.9%  31.9%  18.2%  8.7% 
Current account balance [of 
GDP] 
− 1.5%  4.0%  − 1.9%  6.0% 
Inflation, GDP deflator  5.7%  2.5%  7.5%  − 0.6% 
Agriculture [of GDP]  6%  5%  16%  10% 
Adult Literacy Rate  90.0%  99.6%  62.8% 
(2006) 
94.0% 
Poverty headcount ratio at $2 a 
day, PPP  
9.9%  0.1%  75.6%  36.3% 
(2005) 
Income share held by highest 
10% 
42.5%  33.5%  31.1%  31.4% 
(2005) 
Life expectancy at birth [years]  72.6  68.9  64.1  73.3 
Internet users [per 100]  39.2  42.1  5.3  28.8 
Urban population [of total]  86.0%  72.8%  29.8%  44.0% 
Military expenditure [of GDP]  1.6%  4.3%  2.7%  2.0% 
CO2 emissions [metric tons per 
capita] (2007) 
1.94  10.8  1.43  4.95 
Ease of Doing Business  124th   116th  135th   78th  
World Governance 
Indicators  
[percentiles – higher is better] 
Voice and Accountability  62  23  60  5 
Political Stability  54  22  13  30 
Government Effectiveness  58  45  54  58 
Regulatory Quality  55  35  44  46 
Rule of Law  50  24  56  45 
Control of Corruption  56  11  47  36 
World Values Survey 2005         
Feeling of happiness [―very 
happy‖] 
34.1%  11.0%  29.0%  21.2% 
Aims of the country for the next 
ten years?  
       
Economic growth  59.0%  74.1%  49.5%  45.3% European researcher. 2011. № 12 (15) 
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Strong defence forces  9.3%  12.2%  14.3%  22.7% 
People should have a greater say  25.6%  11.4%  13.8%  8.1% 
Pride of nationality [―very 
proud‖] 
39.3%  45.8%  72.8%  21.3% 
Men make better political leaders 
than women [―agree strongly‖] 
5.9%  24.2%  21.2%  9.9% 
 
The reconfiguration of global economic ties and its cultural implications   
As BRIC economies are becoming more important in the world economy, we can expect a 
reconfiguration of global economic ties and a growth in intercultural contact. In international 
business growing investment ties will lead to more contacts, both in negotiations with foreign 
partners and as expatriates are sent to open new or manage acquired foreign subsidiaries. This 
relationship works both ways. Savvy investors from established economies enter BRIC countries to 
do business and take advantage of growing markets. At the same time, companies from BRIC 
countries increasingly have a size and purchasing power that allows them to expand their interests 
abroad  and  invest  in  other  economies  [7].  This  section  will  examine  in  more  detail  the 
interpenetration of BRIC and established economies through foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
transnational corporations and its (inter-)cultural implications.  
Foreign direct investment is the most significant channel of creating business ties which lead 
to long-lasting intercultural contacts. FDI now outstrips trade in its importance for delivering 
goods and services to foreign markets [8]. While trade presents a mode of economic exchange with 
rather limited intercultural contact, FDI – whether in the form of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
or greenfield investment – comes with a stronger exposure to cultural difference as companies set 
up shop in foreign countries. While dealing with cultural differences in a corporate setting already 
poses a challenge within the familiar confines of North America and Western Europe [9], this 
situation is exacerbated as BRIC economies enter the field as major players. The case of Brazil‘s 
Vale acquiring Canadian Inco is instructive here (see Text Box 1).  
Text Box 1: Cultural conflicts: Brazilian Vale buys Canadian Inco 
When Brazilian mining giant Vale bought Canadian Inco for USD 16.7 billion in 2006, the 
deal came as a surprise to many. Its size marked a milestone for BRIC companies acquiring stakes 
in established economies and underscored the financial prowess of BRIC corporations. It was 
Vale‘s first major deal abroad and it should soon cause its top management major headaches. In a 
clash  of  organizational  cultures,  Vale‘s  top-down  management  style  conflicted  with  a  more 
consensual approach at Inco, resulting in strained relations. A few weeks after the acquisition a 
meeting between Vale and Inco top management came to an abrupt end with what the Financial 
Times describes as ―one of the Brazilians losing his temper [and snapping] ‗How come, if you‘re so 
smart, you didn‘t take us over?‘ … ‗We‘re a culture of ‗why?‘‘ says a former Inco executive, referring 
to the constant exchange of ideas and decentralised decision-making that was encouraged by the 
former Canadian management. On the other hand, he says, ―the Brazilians were: ‗I told you to do 
this. Now do it.‘ … Hinting at the disdain that the Canadians felt towards their new bosses, one of 
the former Inco employees says that ―to run an iron ore business [Vale‘s core business] is almost 
like a high school diploma. Nickel [Inco‘s core business] is a PhD.‖ [10] 
In the course of the integration, the majority of Inco's senior management and key engineers 
were replaced. Vale's unilateral attempt to restructure the bonus system and to switch from a 
defined-benefit to a defined-contribution benefit pension scheme resulted in a prolonged strike by 
miners. Culture was at the centre of the heated disputes. One union representative is quoted as 
saying: ―Vale can go and get stuffed. We are sick and tired of foreign capitalists coming in and 
undermining the Canadian way of life‖ [11]. ―They are not going to change our culture‖ [12].  
Statistical evidence bears out the assumption that mutual investment ties are intensifying. 
The World Investment Prospects Survey puts the four BRIC states in the top five of the most 
attractive economies, with the United States being the only other economy making it into this 
group [13]. In 2009, the BRICs attracted 17.4% of the global FDI inward flows (China 8.5%, Russia 
3.5%, India 3.1%, Brazil 2.3%), roughly matching the relative shares in global output and topping European researcher. 2011. № 12 (15) 
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the table of FDI inflows to emerging and developing economies. All BRIC countries experienced a 
dramatic surge in inbound FDI in the middle of the 1990s, with China benefitting most (Figure 3). 
Towards the end of the 2000s, inbound FDI more or less stabilized at high levels in a range 
between 2.5% and 5.0% of GDP. By comparison, for the G7 this range was much lower, between 
1.0% and 2.5% [13]. Figure 5 shows that China had the largest absolute inward FDI stock, but 
Brazil had the largest stock relative to the size of its economy.  
By contrast, outward FDI from the BRIC countries only started to become significant in the 
early 2000s and remains at lower relative levels than inbound FDI (Figure 4). The share of BRIC 
outward FDI in global FDI stood at only about half of the inflows (9.0%) [13]. Russia is the most 
active BRIC country in this category, whereas China and  India are  latecomers and have only 
recently discovered their appetite for investing abroad. Relative outward FDI from the BRICs is 
drawing closer to that of the G7, which in the past years has fluctuated between 2.0 and 4.0% of 
GDP [13]. As a result, outward FDI stocks have jumped up sharply (Figure 6). Brazil‘s stock has 
increased more than three-fold between 2000 and 2009, China‘s eight-fold, Russia‘s twelve-fold 
and India‘s thirty-eight-fold, albeit all from very low levels [13].  
 
 
Figure 3: Development of incoming foreign direct investment (% of GDP) in the 
BRICs from 1980 to 2010 (Source: [13]) 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Development of outward foreign direct investment (% of GDP) in the BRICs 
from 1980 to 2010 (Source: [13]) 
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Figure 5: Development of inward FDI stocks (current USD billion) in the BRICs from 
1993 to 2010 (Source: [13]) 
 
 
Figure 6: Development of outward FDI stocks (current USD billion) in the BRICs 
from 1993 to 2010 (Source: [13]) 
 
The  characteristics  of  outward  FDI  vary  among  the  BRIC  countries  with  no  clear 
patterns. For Brazil and Russia the major destinations are established economies, India 
has  a  roughly  equal  balance  of  established  and  emerging  economies,  whereas  China 
predominantly targets developing economies. In Russia, the primary sector dominates as a 
target  of outward FDI, in India the secondary sector and in China and  Brazil it is the 
tertiary sector [14; 15; 16]. 
Despite the BRICs‘ quick growth in outward FDI, BRIC transnational corporations 
(TNCs) still show a low degree of foreign assets, sales and employment when compared to 
TNCs in established economies. Only two TNCs from BRIC countries are listed among the 
world‘s 100 largest TNCs in terms of foreign assets, and both of them are Chinese state-
owned companies: The investment company CITIC Group is ranked 48th, just above Swiss 
Novartis, while China Ocean Shipping, a shipping and logistics company, is ranked 80th, 
just above Swiss Holcim. Of the largest BRIC TNCs, a vast majority operate in resource-
based sectors such as oil  and gas, mining  and metals (Table 3). Knowledge-based  and 
tertiary sector industries are an exception, with the Russian Sistema as the only tertiary 
sector company to make it into the top 50 TNCs from developing and emerging economies. 
A significant proportion of these companies is state-owned or state-controlled, such as all 
Chinese  TNCs  in  Table  3,  Brazilian  Petrobras,  Russian  Gazprom  and  Indian  Oil  and 
Natural Gas Corporation.  European researcher. 2011. № 12 (15) 
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Table 3 
Ranking of BRIC TNCs among the top 50 non-financial TNCs from developing 
and emerging economies by foreign assets (2008) (Source: [17]) 
 
          Foreign 
Ran
k 
Origi
n 
Logo  Corporatio
n 
Sector  Assets 
[millio
n 
USD] 
Sales 
[millio
n 
USD] 
Staff 
2 
 
 
CITIC Group  Conglomerate  43 750  5 427  18 305 
7 
 
 
China Ocean 
Shipping 
Shipping and 
Logistics 
28 066  18 041  4 581 
8 
 
 
Lukoil  Oil and Gas  21 515  87 637  23 00
0 
9 
 
  Vale  Mining  19 635  30 939  4 725 
* 
    Gazprom  Oil and Gas  17 326  58 415  9 000 
15 
 
  Tata Steel  Metals  16 826  26 426  45 86
4 
16 
 
  Petrobras  Oil and Gas  15 075  40 179  6 775 
18 
 
  Gerdau  Metals  13 658  10 724  22 315 
20 
 
 
Oil and 
Natural Gas 
Corporation 
Oil and Gas  13 477  4 238  3 291 
23 
 
  Evraz  Metals and 
Mining 
11 196  12 805  29 48
0 
27 
 
  China 
National 
Petroleum 
Oil and Gas  9 409  4 384  20 48
9 
29 
 
 
Hindalco 
Industries 
Metals  8 564  11 371  13 447 
32 
 
  Severstal  Metals  8 066  9 325  12 662 
37 
 
 
China State 
Construction 
& 
Engineering 
Construction  7 015  3 619  15 765 
40 
 
  Tata Motors  Automobile  6 767  9 869  17 998 
47 
 
  Sinochem  Conglomerate  6 409  34 218  225 
50 
 
  Sistema  Telecom  5 698  3 983  11 000 
 
* 2007 data from [18]; not listed in [17] 
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With the rapid growth of outward FDI in the past years, however, BRIC TNCs are 
likely  to  make  further  inroads  into  the  global  top  100  TNCs  and  become  more  active 
abroad [19]. Among the largest deals in the recent past have been the 2007 acquisition of 
the  British  Corus  Group  by  the  Indian  Tata  Steel  for  USD  13.5  billion  and  the  2006 
acquisition of Canadian Inco by Vale for USD 16.7 billion (see Text Box 1). But big deals are 
also  closed  with  other  BRIC  economies  and  developing  countries:  Sinopec‘s  2010 
acquisition of a minority stake in Repsol‘s Brazilian operations for USD 7.1 billion and 
India‘s Bharti Airtel acquisition of Nigeria‘s Zain Africa for USD 10.7 billion are likely to 
mark only the beginning of a larger acquisition and investment spree fuelled by strong 
growth of corporate revenues and profits in the BRIC economies.  
Notwithstanding  the  rapid  expansion  of  TNCs  from  BRIC  economies,  inward 
investment from TNCs headquartered in established economies still dominates the game 
in  BRIC  economies.  Liberalisations,  deregulations  and  other  improvements  in  the 
investment climate have driven part of the inward FDI growth in the BRIC economies. 
With China‘s accession to the WTO in 2001 and Russia‘s expected entry for 2012, barriers 
for FDI are progressively being removed. The EU is the main source of inward FDI for 
Brazil and Russia with more than half of the capital inflows originating there. The figures 
for India and China are much lower, which is partly attributable to the significant intra-
regional investment flows in Asia, but they still outstrip the inward flows from both the US 
and Japan [20]. Even though the EU is a major investor, the share of BRIC holdings in the 
total FDI stocks has only been growing slowly. This can in part be attributed to attractive 
investment  opportunities  elsewhere,  specifically  in  Eastern  Europe,  and  the  still  high 
dominance of established economies in the FDI market [20].  
The sectoral distribution of inward FDI into BRICs is rather uneven. In India and 
Brazil, the service sector attracts the majority of FDI, whereas it is manufacturing in China 
and oil and gas in Russia [21; 22; 23]. All BRIC states boast a significant presence of wholly 
or  partly  owned  foreign  subsidiaries.  Large  recent  M&A  deals  have  included  Spain‘s 
Telefonica buying a USD 10.5  billion stake in Vivo, the largest Brazilian mobile phone 
operator, and Pepsi acquiring Wimm-Bill-Dann, a Russian dairy and fruit juice company, 
for USD 3.8 billion.  
The emerging shift from ‗cosy‘ M&As within Western Europe and North America, 
which for the time being are still the home markets of the big deals, to M&As between 
companies from BRIC and established economies has so far received little attention from 
scholars.  The  reconfiguration  of  global  economic  ties  in  what  is  sometimes  called  the 
second  wave  of  globalization  underscores  the  necessity  of  dealing  with  challenges 
associated with firm integration and intercultural communication. The expectations of the 
new partners are often divergent, not least because they operate in different institutional 
environments. In addition to issues of organizational culture, geopolitical sensitivities can 
also intervene, as the case of Rio Tinto and Chinalco  demonstrates (Text Box 2). This 
global reconfiguration calls for an approach that is more sensitive to cultural differences at 
different scale levels, from the global and institutional to the organizational and individual. 
For, as in the case of Rio Tinto and Chinalco, companies in BRIC states are embedded into 
particular institutional environments and geopolitical rationalities that shape their scope 
of action just as much as the organizational and individual factors that have hitherto drawn 
the largest share of attention.  
Text Box 2: Who is afraid of the yellow man? Opposition to M&A bids 
from BRIC economies – the case of Rio Tinto and Chinalco 
While greenfield investments propose to build new production capacities and create 
new jobs, M&A bids are often received with some apprehension, because of the potential 
downsizing of the workforce and shutting down of operations that sometimes comes with 
the realisation of synergies. In the case of BRIC TNCs bidding for corporate takeovers, European researcher. 2011. № 12 (15) 
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there has frequently been fierce opposition nurtured by fears of the culturally alien which 
has  resulted  in  deals  being  postponed  or  shelved  altogether  [24].  The  controversy 
surrounding the bid by Chinalco, a Chinese mining firm, for an almost USD 20 billion 
stake in the Anglo-Australian Rio Tinto, one of the world‘s largest mining companies, in 
2009 is an instructive example. The bid was initially welcomed by senior management as 
providing additional liquidity to refinance existing debts in the midst of the financial crisis. 
But the Australian government and regulators were very apprehensive of growing Chinese 
influence in a strategically important sector. This fear was heightened as the Australians 
considered the state-owned Chinalco a pawn of the Chinese government in the game to 
secure  the  supply  of  iron-ore  in  what  has  been  a  seller‘s  market.  Rio  Tinto  eventually 
spurned the deal and China retaliated with an arrest of four Rio Tinto staff on charges of 
bribery and cartel formation, which temporarily soured relationships between Australia 
and  China  [25].  In  this  case,  the  mix  of  cultural  reservation  and  geopolitical  concerns 
created an explosive cocktail that brought down the proposed investment.  
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Аннотация.  В  статье  изучается  влияние  стран  БРИК  (Бразилия-Россия-
Индия-Китай)  через  призму  центральных  социо-экономических  показателей, 
включая  показатели  государственного  управления  Всемирного  банка  и  пересмотр 
мировых  ценностей,  учитывается  сдвиг  в  экономических  показателях  и  начало 
изменений  в  экономических  связях,  о  чем  свидетельствуют  прямые  иностранные 
инвестиции  и  появление  транснациональных  корпораций  и  рассматриваются 
итоговые проблемы межкультурных контактов на разных уровнях посредством двух 
кратких предметных исследований.  
Ключевые  слова:  БРИК;  Бразилия;  Россия;  Индия;  Китай;  растущие 
экономики;  глобальная  экономика;  прямые  иностранные  инвестиции; 
транснациональные корпорации. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 